Museletter 248: A Theory of Change for a Century of Crisis

MuseLetter #248 / January 2013 by Richard Heinberg

Download printable PDF version here (PDF, 101 KB)

This first Museletter of 2013 is in two parts. First up is the conclusion of the address which I gave to the International Conference on Sustainability, Transition and Culture Change in November. Second are musings on the very topical issue of the “fiscal cliff”. As readers will be only too aware, the last ditch compromise doesn’t address the real crisis. Best wishes to you for the new year. Richard

Conflict and Change in the Era of Economic Decline: Part 2

A theory of change for a century of crisis

The following is the final part of an essay which was originally an address to the International Conference on Sustainability, Transition and Culture Change, November 16, 2012, by Richard Heinberg. For Part 1 see Museletter #247.
If groups seeking to make the post-carbon transition go more smoothly and equitably are to have much hope of success, they need a sound strategy grounded in a realistic theory of change. Here, briefly, is a theory of change that makes sense to me.
For the past four decades, since the release of Limits to Growth, there have been many scattered efforts to develop alternatives to our current fossil-fueled, growth-based industrial paradigm. These include renewable energy systems; local, organic, and permaculture food systems; urban design movements seeking to reduce the dominance of the automobile in our built environment; architectural programs with the goal of designing buildings that require no external energy input and that are constructed using renewable and recycled materials; alternative currencies not attached to interest-bearing debt, as well as alternative banking models; and alternative economic indicators that take account of social and environmental factors. While such efforts have achieved some small degree of implementation, varying significantly from place to place around the globe, they have generally failed to substantially reduce reliance on fossil fuels, to blunt the overall momentum of society toward increased consumption of a wide range of renewable and non-renewable materials, to reduce financial instability, or to curtail profound environmental impacts including climate change, loss of biodiversity and topsoil, and more.
What will it take for the conservers, localizers, and de-growthers to win? They have a lot stacked against them. The interests promoting a continuation of growth-as-usual are powerful and have spent decades honing advertising and public relations messages whose proliferation is subsidized by hundreds of billions of dollars annually. These interests have captured the allegiance of nearly every elected official in the world. Most ordinary folks are easily swept along because they want more and better jobs, cheaper gasoline, more flat-screen TVs, and all the other perks that come with fossil-fueled economic expansion.
The main downside to growth-as-usual is that it is unsustainable: it is destined to end in depletion of resources, economic unraveling, and environmental catastrophe. The hope of the conservers, localizers, and de-growthers must therefore be that if the growth-as-usual bandwagon cannot be turned back with persuasion, its inevitable crash will occur in increments, so that each incremental step-down in industrial output can be seized upon as an opportunity to demonstrate the need for alternatives and to promote them.
Advocates of the post-carbon crisis theory of change can point to several useful historic examples. One is the transformation of Cuba’s food system during the Special Period in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting disappearance of subsidized Soviet oil shipments set the stage with a crisis. Several Cuban agronomists had previously advocated for more localized and organic agriculture, to no avail; but when the country was suddenly threatened with starvation, they were called upon to redesign the entire food system. The moral of the story: advocates of a post-carbon economy are likely to make limited headway during times of cheap energy and rapid economic growth, yet when push comes to shove obstacles may disappear. The Cuban example is encouraging, but it is often called into question on the grounds that what worked on an island with an authoritarian government might not work so well in a large, pluralistic democracy such as the U.S.
Paul Gilding, in his book The Great Disruption, proposes World War II as an illustration of the crisis-led theory of change: “[O]n the objective facts, Hitler represented a clear and undeniable threat long before action was taken to defeat him,” writes Gilding. “Famously, Churchill and others had long warned of this threat and been largely ignored or even ridiculed. Society remained in denial, preferring not to recognize the threat. This was because denial avoided full acceptance and what that meant—war and a strong change to the status quo. Yet once . . . denial ended, the response was swift and dramatic. Things change almost overnight. Without the benefit of a retrospective view, it would be much harder to predict when exactly the denial of Hitler’s threat would end. So it’s also hard to predict when the moment will come [when the need for action on climate change is finally recognized], even though in hindsight it will be ‘obvious.’”
Post-Fukushima Japan offers yet another example. In the wake of catastrophic nuclear plant meltdowns, the Japanese people have insisted that other reactors be idled; today only two of the nation’s atomic power plants are operating. That has left Japan with substantially less electricity than normal—enough of a shortfall that economic collapse could have resulted. Instead, businesses and households have slashed energy use, driven by a collective ethical imperative. PV systems have appeared on rooftops across the nation.
The Kansas town of Greensburg was flattened by a tornado in May 2007, but the residents—rather than drifting away or merely trying to rebuild what they had—decided instead to use insurance and government disaster aid money to build what they are calling “America’s greenest community,” emphasizing energy efficiency and using 100 percent renewable energy.
Economist Milton Friedman may have laid down a manifesto for crisis-led theories of change when he wrote: “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When the crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend upon the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.” In this brief passage, Friedman not only sums up the theory nicely, but also forces us to contemplate its dark side. In her book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Naomi Klein describes how Friedman and other neoliberal economists used crisis after crisis, beginning in the 1970s, as opportunities to undermine democracy and privatize institutions and infrastructure across the world. Somehow, the opportunities presented by crisis need to be seized first by citizens and communities to build local, low-carbon production and support infrastructure.
The post-carbon theory of change doesn’t seek to expedite or exacerbate crisis; instead, it encourages building resilience into societal systems in order to minimize the trauma of rapid change. Resilience is often defined as “the ability to absorb shocks, reorganize, and continue functioning.” Shocks are clearly on the way, so we should be doing what we can now to build local inventories and to disperse the control points for critical systems. We should neither simply wait around for crisis to hit, or hope for crisis as an opportunity to alter the status quo; rather, we should do as much as possible to conserve ecosystems and to re-localize production and trade now so as to minimize the crisis—which, after all, could potentially prove overwhelming for both humanity and non-human nature. If and when crisis arrives, such preparations will be crucial in guiding response efforts and providing a basis for resisting “disaster capitalism.”
What’s the likelihood of success? It depends partly on how we define the term in this context. Many people speak of “solving” problems like climate change, as though we could make a modest investment in new technology and then carry on living essentially as we are. Implicit in the post-carbon crisis theory of change is the understanding that the way we are living now is at the heart of our problem. Success could therefore be better defined in terms of minimizing human suffering and ecological disruption as we adapt toward a very different mode of existence characterized by greatly reduced energy and materials consumption.
Some self-proclaimed “doomers” have concluded that crisis will overwhelm society no matter what we do. Many have joined the “prepper” movement, stockpiling guns and canned goods in hopes of maintaining their own households as the rest of the world comes to resemble Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. Other doomers are convinced that human extinction is inevitable and that efforts to prevent that outcome are just so much wasted motion.
I do not share either outlook. Of course there is no guarantee that crisis will open opportunities for sensible adaptation and not simply wallop us, leaving humanity and nature wounded and reeling. But for those who understand what’s coming to simply give up efforts to protect nature and humanity before the going gets tough seems premature at best. There could hardly be more at stake; therefore extraordinary levels of effort and extreme persistence would appear justified if not morally mandatory. The post-carbon crisis theory of change may appear to be a strategy born of desperation. But we should hold open the possibility that it will prove surprisingly apt and effective—to the extent that we have invested our best efforts.
As we build resilience and prepare to make the most of the opportunities that come our way, it’s important that we celebrate the improvements in quality of life that come with reducing our dependency on consumption, advertising, automobiles, and all the other life-smothering accoutrements of our crumbling industrial existence. Let’s also celebrate our adaptability in times of crisis, and continually remind one another that small committed groups sometimes do make history—just as history makes them.
Giant bar chart image via shutterstock

Fiscal Cliff: Nowhere to go But Down

Most folks in Washington and on Wall Street are desperate to avoid the fiscal cliff. That’s because the automatic spending cuts and tax increases that would take effect if we go over the edge would mean an end to recovery and a resumption of economic contraction. But the only way to steer clear of the cliff is for the President and Congress to agree on somewhat smaller spending cuts and tax increases that would substantially reduce federal deficits over time. The assumption all around is that deficits are unsustainable, but we can still have economic growth if we rein them in.
But what if, as I have argued in my book The End of Growth (and as Canadian economist Jeff Rubin explains in his book Flatline, and as U.S. economist Robert Gordon speculates in his paper “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over?”), the nation’s ability to expand its economy has effectively dissipated? In the early-to-mid 20th century, cheap oil and electrification fueled rapid growth of manufacturing and trade, but that was a historic anomaly that economists and policy makers mistakenly assumed was the permanent new normal.
Since the 1970s, growth has been maintained to an ever-greater degree simply by borrowing. For most of these past three to four decades, rising consumer debt was the engine: households took on bigger mortgages, higher credit card balances, larger student loans, and steeper home equity lines of credit in order to pay for more consumption—and rising consumption meant a growing economy. During this period, debt rose at three times the rate of GDP growth. As debt ballooned, the financial industry increased in size relative to manufacturing, agriculture, and the other components of the economy. The financial industry got rich, bought Congress, deregulated itself, and started blowing bubbles in order to milk the system for ever more extravagant profits.
The most recent and by far the biggest of those bubbles was of course the housing bubble of the last decade; when it burst in 2007-2008, households lost trillions in wealth. Americans no longer had the ability to increase their indebtedness (in many cases they couldn’t make payments on existing debt, and banks didn’t want to loan them more). Consumption plummeted. The U.S. economy started shrinking.
Since 2008 Federal Reserve actions have forestalled a banking crisis, while government deficit spending (initially via stimulus programs) has generated a faux-recovery. Most new debt entering the system has been government debt. Federal borrowing, at a rate of about $100 billion a month, has kept the economy on a drip-feed of new money, preventing a collapse of consumption, a disappearance of jobs, and the sort of general self-reinforcing contraction that we got a strong taste of in late 2008 and early 2009.
It’s clear that if we go over the fiscal cliff contraction will resume soon and sharply. But what if we go the gentler route? The hope is that, as government reduces deficit spending, private enterprise and household consumption will resume their historic roles as generators of growth. But (if analysts like me are right) that’s just not going to happen. We’ve reached the limits of what private debt can do for us, and there’s no other route to increasing consumption. Moreover, it’s becoming plain that our existing rates of consumption are undermining the planet’s basic life-support systems and we need to back off the accelerator if we are to leave intact ecosystems to provide for future generations.
So what should we do? The first and most important thing is to clarify our aims. The presumptive goal of policy makers is to return to our “normal” condition of growth. But in fact the key thing to do right now is to recognize that growth is over. It was a temporary and anomalous condition that cannot be extended into the future. That doesn’t mean it’s the end of the world. But it does mean we will have to abandon economic thinking that sees growth as inevitable, normal, and essential. We will need new and different economic strategies and ways of measuring progress over the next few years and decades as we transition back to the true historically normal condition of almost-zero growth—different banking models, a less globalized trade regime, and more locally-based cooperative enterprises. Along the way we will have to shed unsustainable debt burdens through a massive, organized jubilee if we are to avoid years of default and decline.
If we recognize the inevitability of this historic moment and embrace a return to an economy running on local enterprise rather than centralized and globalized debt-driven madness, there will be winners and losers (as there always are during moments of great social and economic change), but most people will find themselves better off in ways that really count in the end.
The fiscal cliff may be seen in retrospect as a driver of leadership and adaptive genius if we take it as an opportunity to examine our assumptions. Otherwise it’s a problem without a solution, a game of chicken in which nearly everyone will lose.

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  • Brian Leslie

    Overall, agreed; but you need to go further:

    The ‘economy’ has been increasingly driven over the last 4 centuries or so, by the private banks’ usurping of the privilege of money-creation, which they achieve by creating-and-lending, with interest added.

    This was the basic reason for the ‘struggle for markets’ which led to the first and second World Wars, and the many others since. Following the bank-deregulation in the 1970s/80s, they have expanded their role to the point that they now create about 97% of our money worldwide, with the inevitably growing debts resulting.

    In the 1920s and 30s, a movement was fast-growing promoting the idea that as mechanisation developed, it displaced workers and so ‘the wages of the machine’ needed to be distributed to the population as ‘National Dividends’ – to end the wage-slavery and allow the growth of leisure. The insane aim of everlasting ‘economic growth’ was not possible in a finite world, but was needed to save the system from collapse.

    Toward the end of the Second World War the deliberate policy of “planned obsolescence” was dreamed-up in the USA (and soon spread worldwide) along with the arms race and wars, to ensure that the huge wartime increase in productive power should never, applied to peacetime production, be able to “saturate the markets” – that is, we should never achieve abundance, and meet everyone’s needs. If abundance were ever allowed to emerge, the ‘markets’ would collapse, and finance-capitalism would collapse in unredeemable debts!
    To maintain demand for its goods, ever since the last world war industry has been developing and perfecting this strategy of planned obsolescence as it squanders resources and pollutes the planet. Products, or major components, are now deliberately designed to be unrepairable, or spare parts are deliberately overpriced, while the original article is underpriced, for the sake of competitive advantage. This is an essential part of this strategy: to persuade, if not to force people to throw away what they have and buy new – in fact, to regard buying new as a prime objective in life! Constantly changing ‘fashions’ are a deliberate part of this. Massive resources are devoted to this campaign of persuasion, and the giving of new meanings to such words as “disposable” is an essential part of this effort.
    The advertising and packaging industries are responsible for massive waste also in their own use of paper, card and plastics, in addition to the waste inherent in the success of persuasion to throw away and buy new.
    A more widely recognised, more obviously murderous aspect of this plan is the build-up of the arms industry, supported by the military build-up. This was ably summarised by Philip Agee in 1991*:
    “Bush is trying to use the Gulf crisis, as Truman used the Korean War, to justify enormous military expenditures in reaction to economic slump and recession, while reducing as much as possible spending on civilian and social programs. Exactly what Reagan and Bush did, for example, in the early and mid 1980s with the “evil empire” scenario as justification.
    “In early 1950 the Truman Administration adopted a program to vastly expand the U.S. and West European military services under a National Security Council document called NSC-68. This document was Top Secret for 25 years, and only by error was it released in 1975 and published. The purpose of military expansion under NSC-68 was to reverse the economic slide that began with the end of World War II wherein the U.S. GNP had declined 20% and unemployment had risen from 700,000 to 4.7 million. U.S. exports, despite the subsidy program known as the Marshall Plan, were inadequate to sustain the economy, [my italics] and remilitarisation of Western Europe would allow transfer of dollars, under so-called defense grants, that would in turn generate European imports from the U.S.
    “As NSC-68 put the situation in early 1950: ‘the United States and other free nations will within a period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed.’
    “The solution adopted, the ‘more positive governmental programs’, was expansion of the military. But support in Congress and the public at large was lacking, for a variety of reasons, not least the increased taxes the program would require. So Truman’s State Department, under Dean Acheson, set out to sell the so-called Communist Threat as justification, through a fear campaign in the media that would create a permanent crisis atmosphere.”
    * – in Gulf War Launches New World Order, in Open Eye, Issue 1
    Since that was written, we have had the Gulf War and the tragedy of ‘9/11’, the resurrection of the ‘Star Wars’ project, and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, then Libya, soon to be followed by Syria, …?
    – The ‘War on Terror’ is the replacement for the ‘Communist Threat’.

    We continue to suffer from lack of money created debt-free, spent into circulation by the government, which should be in pace instead of the debt-based money created by the private banks, which should be illegal!

    In a speech by MERVYN KING, Governor of the Bank of England, “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again” – The Second Bagehot Lecture, at Buttonwood Gathering, New York City on Monday 25 October 2010 – he said “… some form of functional separation … fundamental example would be to divorce the payment system from risky lending activity – that is to prevent fractional reserve banking (for example, as proposed by Fisher, 1936, Friedman, 1960, Tobin, 1987 and more recently by Kay, 2009). ….” -and
    “Eliminating fractional reserve banking explicitly recognises that the pretence that risk-free deposits can be supported by risky assets is alchemy. If there is a need for genuinely safe deposits the only way they can be provided, while ensuring costs and benefits are fully aligned, is to insist such deposits do not coexist with risky assets”. He ended it with “Of all the many ways of organising banking, the worst is the one we have today.”
    In August last year a discussion paper was published by Dr. Michael Kumhof and Dr. Jaromir Benes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an institution that many have come to see as preserving the status quo and protecting the banking sector against the interests of ordinary people. This too offers strong support for full reserve banking. It is “The Chicago Plan Revisited”, and it strongly supports the proposals of Irving Fisher in the 1930s – those which are the basis for Positive Money’s and the American Monetary Institute’s proposals, and many others. In essence: it proposes to forbid banks from creating the money they lend, and places a duty on the State to create all national money needed by society, and for it to enter circulation through government spending, so without creating any debt in the process; – and that such a change would allow the elimination of almost all the debts which have grown to unmanagable levels, and it would make what is physically possible and socially desirable, also financially possible. Dr. Kumhof’s paper has since been widely distributed and studied, and he is now engaged to talk at the Bank of England and many universities about his findings.

    Combine this reform with the issue of basic incomes, and rapid change to a sustainable way of life hold be possible.

  • George Vye

    Well, Rich, almost half a century ago, in Powerdown, you explained, albeit very briefly, the reasons why the environmental community has backed off from discussing overpopulation as a contributor of the problems facing mankind today. What a sellout, not by you, but by the Sierra Club, et al. In fact, you introduced me to the most important book ever published, but almost universally ignored, Bill Catton’s Overshoot. I have read it many tines and it still takes my breath away with its insights. Now you seem to have gravitated toward the conventional economic critiques of economic growth, which, relevant they may be, fail to consider the importance of overpopulation in contributing to the sixth extinction and impending die-off. Have you read Dave Forman’s recent book Man’s Swarm? Nothing new, just mainly an aggregator of other fundamental sources such as Catton, Hardin, the Ehrlichs, etc. but still a valuable resource for the newbies.

  • Lewis Peterson

    Excellent as always Richard. Having recently read Klein’s ‘The Shock Doctrine’, it is clear to see that quick and effective change is possibe following major world events; however, I fear a switch to a localised and sustainable economy may be a protracted process with great suffering.

    Ironically, with the quote you state in your article, the neo-liberal Friedman has provided a perfect mantra for the current situation with regard to climate change (which, amazingly, a large portion of the population refuse to accept) and the “fiscal cliff”.

    Keep up the good work!

  • Alexander Carpenter

    I have just a minor quibble about the wording used in this excellent summary — which could be marginally more powerful if it used more powerful words.

    It’s wise to be somewhat wary of using non-profit-sector jargon (i.e., “theory of change”), given how feckless and generally incompetent that sector is. Its use of such phrases is intended to sound more masterful than it really is, and is, as such, at least unconsciously intended to deceive naive listeners (and would-be hangers-on) about the effectiveness of its efforts to make change in the real world.

    The reason a would-be change agent would have a “theory” of change is because that’s all he has — nothing more grounded. Vague arm-waving, opaque mumbo-jumbo, and sloganeering are not evidence of skillful means.

    In this context, a “theory” is an abstraction, often superimposed on reality for ideological (or market) reasons. Almost by definition, a theory is something that is not real, not directly experienced, and is interpretational and, probably, projective (“wishful thinking”). Theories are usually normative, oriented to “shoulds.”

    At its best, a “theory of change” is a hypothesis to be tested: “If we do this, then that will happen.” Elements of guesswork and interpolation abound: “We don’t really know what happens, so we are hypothesizing what should happen, or what we want to happen” (and in the social “sciences,” those hypotheses are almost always entirely un-testable due to abstraction, complexity, uncontrolled variables, the ethical challenges of separating control groups, and the expense and resource-inefficiency of longitudinal studies).

    Even when legitimate scientific tools are used, the end-result is still only increased credibility of the conclusions: the hypothesis can never be “proven” true (it can only be falsified).

    Such a process is largely irrelevant when we already have a body of direct shared collective experiential knowledge that provides us a consistent “benefit scenario” describing what actually is known to be happening and how it has been accomplished.

    A “model” is literally a representation of known interconnecting parts of reality, and of how they connect. Models represent varying degrees of completeness and accuracy, and all are imperfect. Models naturally evolve to become more complete because functional gaps become evident and we have a natural impulse to bridge them from our direct experience. Modeling invites grounded experimentation and closer examination of reality. A model is stronger than a theory, and although these might just be words, words have more power than we like to admit.

    If we have any grounded experience at making change, we would be more realistic and honest to call our simplified description of what we already do a model of change — a “model” because it is a description of, and an extraction from, our shared direct experience of reality as recorded in some actual body of measured and confirmed change, such that we are modeling what we actually already do. Instead of abstraction, we have simplification. Inevitably, and beneficial for communicability, such a model is way simpler than reality, and simple enough to give clarity.

    It is easier to establish credible causal connection from a model than from a theory, because a model starts with, and maintains, such connection. We model what we already know so we can learn more, so we can fill in the unknown stages to complete a picture and understanding, and so we can learn where our efforts are more and less effective. Modeling works better with complex non-linear open systems, because interpolated theories tend to be too simple, too linear, and too disconnected to adequately bridge gaps in describing reality and in knowledge of process.

    “Business process modeling” in software development is an excellent example, worthy of systematic imitation. “Climate modeling” is another example, and reveals many of the pitfalls of the modeling process, such as reductionist linearization, reliance on oversimplification, dubious assumptions and boundary conditions, and the discounting of facts for political reasons, both pro and con. Worst of all is “economic modeling,” where economic models are only slightly less of an embarrassment than the economic theories themselves.

    Richard Heinberg provides good examples of instances of effective responses to change. We would be better off extrapolating from them into more-general models, rather than theorizing about them. Theorizing suggests that we understand the fundamentals (which no wise person will claim); modeling invites more empirical experimentation. In either case, humility is appropriate and empowering.

    However, Heinberg shouldn’t be too humble about this empowering presentation: it’s just this kind of overview that gives us all a good sense of what we can rely on in the future, a sense that we can improve with more experience.

  • Endofmore

    all that we have, all that we do, is created and held together by the surplus energy factor within our industrial infrastructure.
    remove that energy factor and society will fall apart and readjust itself to a mean level that does not need that volume of energy surplus.
    Only the way this happens is up for debate, not whether it will or not.
    I have a great deal of respect for Paul Gilding’s work, except for his staggering assertion that we can apply the effort needed to win WW2 to overcome our present crisis. WW2 was an exercise in intercontinental fuelburning. The USA had more fuel available to throw on the fire, and so won. If Japan and Germany had had more fuel available, the would have won. It really is that simple. Germany certainly had better weapons, at least initially.
    As to Cuba, that nation enjoys a benign climate in an island environment.. Try fitting the Cuban model to Russia or Saudi Arabia when their oil runs out…. at least the Museletter acknowledges that, but I think it needs re-emphasizing
    Anyone doubting our reliance on oil should imagine everything (literally) that they possess which has a component of oil coal or gas embedded within it, removed. They will be sitting naked on bare earth

  • Marion

    Excellent post! I so appreciate your clarity.